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Language Usage and Social Action in the 
Psychoanalytic Encounter: Discourse Analysis of a 









A fragment of a therapy session is discussed using some of the tools of discourse analysis 
in an effort to demonstrate how speech acts serve as vehicles for the negotiation of roles 
and the transmittal of emotional/relational messages in the therapeutic dyad. In particular, 
issues of power asymmetry, proper function of the therapist, patient autonomy, and 
emotional attachment are subtextually communicated about through types of speech acts 
such as propositional triggers and utterances that are ambiguous as to their illocutionary 
and perlocutionary forces. The analysis of the speech acts in the session provides a 
microscopic identification of the expression of macro-level theoretical phenomena such 




With the accelerating breakdown of the hegemony of classical Freudian thought in the 
psychoanalytic world over the past three to four decades, post-modernist relativism 
rapidly became a cliché in psychoanalytic circles. No school could any longer lay claim 
to a monopoly on truth. Indeed, the notion of truth itself was been rendered highly 
problematic. The anti-realist views of philosophers of science such as Kuhn (1970) 
penetrated the psychoanalytic world via the work of psycho-analytic writers such as 
Spence (1982). In the latter's discussion of "narrative truth", a correspondence theory of 
truth was abandoned in favour of a coherence view of personal narrative. Through the 
analytic process, the patient's initial narrative is, gradually replaced by a new, presumably 
more coherent or useful narrative negotiated with the therapist. However, as Gergen and 
Kaye (1991) pointed out, while this view may be a useful description of analytic practice, 
there are several problems with it as a description of or a prescription for the therapeutic 
process. This conceptualization still privileges the analyst's narrative account of the 
patient's experience over the patient's initial narrative account. The analyst still seems to 
have a pre-existing "truth", albeit in quotes, a privileged story that s/he imposes on the 
"material" the patient brings. In the work of many narrativists, the view of the therapist as 
possessing a special knowledge of souls has still not been superseded.  
 
Moreover, while the question of truth has been relativized, the problem of truth has been 
preserved in a narrativist framework that still relies heavily on a notion of representation. 
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What analyst and analysand are said to be doing is constructing better stories, i.e., better 
pictures or representations of something "out there". To this conception, Gergen and 
Kaye posed a different view of therapy as enacting and creating meanings through 
dialogic acts. Psychoanalytic writers, such as Hoffman (1991), also went beyond 
relativism to the position of social constructionism. This view tries not to privilege the 
analyst's meanings but rather sees the meanings arrived at by both participants in the 
therapeutic dialogue as mutually and interactively constituted. Such a position must 
necessarily force a reconceptualization of the nature of the therapist's activity and 
expertise. If therapy is not simply the replacement of one narrative with another, what 
else is it? The trend of thinking in Hoffman's work, and in the work of non-
psychoanalytic social constructionists such as Gergen, is to see the therapeutic situation 
as an arena of (potentially) creative dialogic enactments. 
 
In what follows, I will attempt to address the question of the grammar and vocabulary of 
some of these enactments. Some very interesting prior work in this area is collected in 
Siegfried (1995). Most of the work in this volume is by non-explicitly psychoanalytic 
writers (one notable exception being M. Horowitz). A more recent collection of work on 
conversational analysis of psychotherapy edited by Peräkylä, Antaki, Vehviläinen and 
Leudar (2008), building on the pioneering work in this area by Labov and Fanschel 
(1977), analyses patient/therapist turn-taking sequences.  Several of the authors in this 
book examine dialogic specimens of how therapists use linguistic strategies such as 
substituting single words or short phrases (i.e., Rae) or reformulations (i.e., Antaki) as a 
means of introducing new meanings or extending patients’ meanings in what the therapist 
deems therapeutically/emotionally useful ways. Peräkylä in this same volume discusses 
intersubjectivity by means of analysing how patients signal various levels of agreement 
or disagreement with therapist’s interpretations. Streeck (also in this 2008 collection) 
discusses enactment but principally from the non-verbal gestural side. Of course, much 
has been written about enactment from a psychoanalytic/relational point of view.  
 
Tilly’s (2006) sociological work on reason-giving for action is an interesting discussion 
of how reason-giving functions in the negotiation of roles and relationships, one very 
important subset of meanings.  In the case example I give below, the therapist (myself) 
asks a series of questions. Questions on the face of it are seeking answers - reasons for 
action, explanations or accounts of motives, statements of rules of social behaviour, and 
so forth. In this sample of dialogue, role negotiation is a salient feature as is the attempt to 
make possibly implicit emotional meanings explicit. 
 
As Hoffman has noted (1992), there are limits to the range of meanings that the members 
of the therapeutic dyad can co-produce. Neither participant just "decides" what to say, 
what move to make. Rather, in Hoffman's terms: "…among the limiting factors are the 
temperaments and resources of the participants as well as the analyst's and patient's 
unconscious interest in particular kinds of interaction and associated unconscious 
resistance to other forms (p.294)". 
 
To these considerations I would add that the means for co-producing meaning are also 
socio-culturally limited. This is to say that in all our conversations, including the 
therapeutic conversation, we are following rules not necessarily of our own devising. We 
are playing “language games” as Wittgenstein (1953) first pointed out, which are in turn 
embedded in social "games", practices, or, as Wittgenstein termed them, "forms of life". 
It is with these tools that we socially generate meaning. Therapist and patient are at times 
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agreeing and at other times disagreeing about what it is they are doing, and much of this 
shared or divergent understanding of what they are about is unformulated. This, I think, is 
necessarily so for two reasons. First, there is the high speed of the analytic exchange, 
which, in this respect, is no different from many other forms of social encounter. There is 
no way we could become conscious, in the moment, of all the language games we are 
playing. But, secondly, embedded as we are within these forms of life, it is difficult for us 
to be aware of them as such. There is always some "horizon" of experience as Merleau-
Ponty termed it (1962), which is difficult if not impossible to transcend or even 
comprehend. In part, this is because the rules of social and linguistic practice by means of 
which we constitute our worlds lie right under our noses. Thus, we take no note of them, 
or, taking note, we view them as so general and obvious as to seem trivial.  We always 
can, but do not usually ask ourselves how we know what a speaker means by what he or 
she says. This field of inquiry is part of the discipline of speech pragmatics, which 
includes the study of linguistic forms, of reference, presupposition, types of speech act, 
relation of utterance to linguistic and social/action context, rules of turn-taking in dialogic 
exchange, and so forth. Although the formalized study of speech pragmatics is a technical 
specialized field spanning aspects of linguistics, philosophy (Austin, 1962), psychology, 
and sociology; the intuitive, implicit use of the rules and practical procedures of speaking 
and of understanding what another is saying is something that as naive laypersons we do 
every day. We do not have to be students of speech pragmatics to function in everyday 
social life. However, I would suggest that, as therapists, we are enhanced in our 
functioning by the more detailed understanding of dialogic process that inquiry into 
speech pragmatics provides. Indeed, knowledge of or, better, sensitivity to the subtleties 
of dialogic process could be said to constitute an essential aspect of our expertise. 
 
But also, as noted above, linguistic practice is embedded in, if partially constitutive of, 
social practice. The forms of social practice include but go beyond the linguistic. If we 
ask the question of how we know what a person is doing extra-linguistically (in the sense 
of social action) by saying something, then we are starting to tread on somewhat broader 
but shiftier ground. We are entering the field where we can begin to talk about the 
underlying rules of communicative aims, i.e., the grammar of motives and purposes, 
intentional, quasi-intentional, or so deeply embedded as to be not easily formulable. This 
field includes the area of psychodynamic theory which we, as therapists, make use of to 
varying extents and in a more or less systematic way. It also includes the common-sense 
psychological and sociological theories of motivation that we all, therapists and lay-
persons alike, make use of, however consciously or unconsciously, in daily life. As 
applied to therapy, we might call this the field of receptive/passive or interpretive 
therapeutic speech pragmatics, insofar as we, at any given point, make use of a more or 
less systematic theory of social action (of which the dynamic metapsychologies are a 
subset) to understand the (speech) actions of each member of the therapeutic dyad. 
Finally, there is the question of what we do with our understandings of what we and the 
other are saying/doing in the therapy setting, however we arrive at these understandings. 
These involve questions of therapeutic aim and technique or, if we narrow it to linguistic 
activity, active or productive therapeutic speech pragmatics. Thus, there are at least three 
distinguishable levels of language use that come into play in therapeutic practice. First, 
are the everyday rules of language that enable basic communication; then there are the 
higher order social and psychological inferences about meaning and intention (which 
includes affect); and, finally, there are our conceptions of what we do as therapists with 
the meanings developed in the analytic encounter. 
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It might seem intuitively evident that these three levels of language use and 
understanding are hierarchically ordered. That is to say, one might suppose that the 
common-sense pragmatics of the rules of discourse are the basis of everyday 
understanding upon which the more arcane psychodynamic type of understanding is 
founded and that the theory of technique flows out of, or is entailed by, this latter kind of 
understanding. However, I would argue that no such simple hierarchy of knowledge of 
language use obtains in the therapy situation. Rather, we often jump from one level to 
another without acknowledging it to ourselves. This is to say that not everything we say 
or do in psychoanalysis is motivated out of the concerns of psychoanalytic theory. Rather, 
much of what we say and do as therapists is directly conditioned by culturally received 
linguistic and social common sense. 
 
Of course, sometimes our psychological theory (our subcultural "common sense") moves 
us to override the general common sense. Moreover, and more importantly, theoretical 
and common- sense understandings and action are not always conceivable as two distinct 
moments in the therapeutic encounter. Rather, what we do as speakers in our culture 
shapes our understanding of what we are doing as therapists. A parallel situation obtains 
for the patient. His/her understanding of what s/he is doing qua patient takes place against 
a background of implicit everyday social communicative action. 
 
Also, and importantly, understandings of the situation do not arise in an interpersonal 
vacuum but are always created under the influence (including implicit and explicit 
demands and instructions) of the other. These understandings then constitute an 
interpersonal field of meanings beyond the individual's control, an "intertext" in Bakhtin's 
terminology (Todorov, 1984). The intertext is a constantly developing organic process 
and product. As the dialogic interchange unfolds over time new possibilities and choice 
points of meaning and action open up. These choice points are complexly contingent on 
many factors, among which our awareness of choices and possibilities is, I believe, 
primary. Our awareness of choices depends on a subtle textual and textural sensitivity to 
the communicative actions, i.e., the gestures, moves, meanings, language games, and 
social beliefs and expectations of ourselves and the other. In order to demonstrate some 
of these nuances and possibilities of language use and meaning in the therapy situation, I 
will turn to an actual example of therapeutic discourse and interaction. 
 
Case study 
A woman in her early 30's has been in therapy for seven years through many life 
vicissitudes including a series of conflicted and often self-destructive love relationships, a 
long period of dissatisfaction with her work and the launching of a new career path, and 
many battles in an ongoing struggle to separate herself from her family of origin. In the 
year preceding the session I am about to describe, she had come to be in a basically 
satisfying relationship with a man, had gotten started in graduate school and been able to 
distance herself more than previously from the troubling influence of her family. She 
came to the session, having spoken in recent weeks about heading towards termination. 
Toward the end of the session, the following exchange ensued. 
 
 
1Patient (Pt.): (Sigh) Well…I know I have to leave (falling tone)…(Long pause in 
which the patient looks away and then at me.) 
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1Therapist (Th.): Ah, hmm…How do you know that? 
 
2Pt.: (Looks slightly taken aback) I mean…I guess it's time for me to move on. 
 
2Th.: What makes you guess? Is that something you can guess? 
 
3Pt.: (puzzled, indulgent smile) What do you mean? (gently rising tone)  
 
3Th.: It just doesn't seem like something you can know or guess about. It's something 
you decide. 
 
4Pt.: Well, yeah… I can decide…that's all. (Long pause, bites lip) It's just hard to say 
goodbye. Like you know in the spring? After the last group I was talking to Ed 
downstairs? and I just couldn't say goodbye. It made everything seem so meaningless 
if I could just walk away from it. So I told myself, "Well, you don't have to". That's 
why I said I'd be in the group again. 
 




5Th.: And now?…about leaving individual? 
 
6Pt.: Oh well, that's different. I suppose I could just go on forever…make it 
permanent (laughs). 
 
6Th.: But you know you have to stop. 
 
7Pt.: Oh Ok. (mock exasperation) you know what I mean. 
 
7Th.: Yeh...But what? You can't say goodbye to me either? 
 
8Pt.: Well, yeah, sort of. It trivializes the whole thing. 
 
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2013, 2 (1), 4-19 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.2013.0001 
9 
8Th.: (in a tone of sudden discovery) Ah…I wonder if you think it's trivial to me. 
 
9Pt.: Right. Isn't that ridiculous? As if seven years were nothing? 
 
9Th.: No no no (fast, compressed)…It's not just the time…It's like I'm not supposed to 
have, couldn't have any feelings towards you. 
 
10Pt.: Yeahh (looks toward me and smiles) I know that's absurd (long silence) So I 
guess it's time to leave, huh? 
 
10Th.: It's up to you. It's what you decide. 
 
11Pt.: I know. I know. But, it's also…there are these things to work on…Like this 
crazy jealousy that Z (the man she is living with) and I have about our pasts. And that 
stuff last time about how I have so much to prove academically. God, I felt 
worse...Like uh oh I really have a long way to go. (long silence) 
 
11Th.: What's up? 
 




13Pt.: Feels like I haven't made much progress. 
 
13Th.: (pause) Weeeeeell, I don't know. If you think about all the stuff we've been 
through and where you're at in your life now…I don't know if you can really say that. 
  
14Pt.: Yeah, (shrugs) But I always doubt it…You know how I always doubt 
everything. And then I'm afraid I'm not doing everything just right and my mother will 
say "I told you so" (laughs) Well…maybe I should stay a little while more...(long 
silence) 
 
14Th.: (hesitant half-laugh) Are you asking me or telling me? 
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15Pt.: I don't know…both. 
 
15Th.: (after another long pause) Well, look here, if you're asking me whether you're 
fixed, whether you graduate now with your BMH, I'll tell you what I've told you 
before. You've made a lot of progress, it's naive to think that there'll come some 
definitive point at which you're fixed, no more problems. I'm sure you could continue 
this work on your own; I think you'll be OK without therapy, but it's up to you. It's 
what you want to do…(pause) But, now, if you're asking me will I miss you? The 
answer is yes. But, I'm certainly not going to tell you what you should do, (tone of 
mock desperation), cause there ain't no should. 
 
16Pt.: OK. (long pause) 
 
16Th.: OK (long pause) 
 
17Pt.: I'll see you next week. 
 
17Th.: (nods) See you then. 
 
In reviewing this and other segments of therapeutic dialogue, I have recurrently been 
struck by how complex the therapy interaction can be when considered at any relatively 
fine level of detail. One can analyze what is happening in terms of the theory of 
psychoanalytic technique (relative to certain standard notions of therapeutic aim), at the 
level of conscious, pre-conscious, or unconscious motive and affect of both actors (often 
summarized as transference and countertransference), at the level of social action 
considered from a sociological point of view (e.g., assertions of the speakers as to their 
respective statuses, roles, and competences in these roles) and at the level of discourse, 
linguistically considered (what are the speech acts involved and the sequencing rules for 
these that are being followed in the discourse). If you really get into it, there is too much 
to say. So for the sake of staying focused, I will try to anchor the discussion on some 
linguistic features of the dialogue. 
 
First, the patient's initial "I know that..." locution functions, to use a term of speech 
pragmatic theory, as a presupposition or propositional trigger. "I know that" embeds the 
proposition "I have to leave", thus suggesting that the latter is a declarative proposition 
which could be true or false. But, this is already complex and contradictory because the 
sub-predicate "have to" is not, strictly speaking, declarative in its form. It is more like an 
imperative, a command given to oneself. To use a term first introduced by the 
philosopher, Austin (1962), its illocutionary force, i.e., what kind of speech act it is, is 
ambiguous. It trades on other uses of "have to" which seem closer to reports of states of 
affairs rather than expressions of mere want or obligation. So, perhaps, we might 
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understand the speaker to be saying that she feels she ought to leave. This would count as 
a statement with a truth value - either she does or does not feel she ought to leave. But 
this is our gloss on her text, and certainly not the only one warrantable by what she said. 
What seems evident, just from the form of her words themselves, leaving aside any 
higher order psychological theory, is that the speaker or rather the speech means more 
than she or it says. Thus, we are compelled to examine connotations of key words and 
how these connotations condition each other. Making no pretention at exhaustiveness, I 
will list a few senses of "know" that might apply here: “feel compelled to”; “resignedly 
accept (that)” (this is perhaps communicated by the preceding “sigh”); “believe that you 
think I should”; “hope that you think I should (or should not)”; “want to”; etc. Also, 
various combinations of these seem possible such as, “believe-that-you-think-I-should-
plus-I-don't-want-to”; or “hope-you-think-I-should-plus-I-want-to”; (or, alternatively, 
“plus-I-don't-want-to”). Any connotation or combination of connotations will carry a 
slightly different motivational force, capturing different issues in how the speaker feels 
about herself, about the therapist, what she wants the therapist to feel or desire in the 
situation, what she wants the therapist to believe she feels or desires in the situation, and 
so forth. The question of which reading is most accurate or useful will be conditioned by 
many things, including one's own theoretical predilections and the patient's own self-
understanding, whether theoretically informed or not, as best as one can discern it. And, 
of course, one's choice of reading will partly condition one's response, and one's response 
as therapist will retroactively confer a particular meaning or set of meanings on the 
patient's initial utterance. Thus, interpretive pragmatics and productive pragmatics are 
inevitably intertwined. One cannot have an action orientation in a situation without some 
reading of the situation's significance, and, vice-versa, one cannot have any 
understanding of the situation outside of all possible action tendencies or intentions. In 
short, we are always choosing our meanings even as we, seemingly involuntarily, create 
them. 
 
But, I want here to advance two simple claims. First, you don't need a very developed 
theory to tell that something of interest is going on in attending to the utterance that we 
have been discussing. You can tell that the words mean more than they say by paying a 
little attention to how they are being used and in what tone they are being said. The point 
of developing a sensitivity to, say, ambiguous illocutionary forces is not to be able to sit 
there and say, "Aha! An ambiguous illocutionary force!" Rather, it is to sharpen our 
linguistic and social alertness to the many possible meanings and action possibilities of 
the situation without a lot of theoretical prejudice about what these might be. For 
example, a knowledge of the different illocutionary forces of utterances in the therapeutic 
situation that are ostensibly functioning as questions (coming from either the patient or 
the therapist) can help us become more aware of the many dimensions of the processes 
we are engaged in with our patients (Schneider, 1991). 
  
Second, sometimes a fairly content-less awareness of possible subtext based on linguistic 
sensitivity alone can enable the analyst to question or comment on the patient's utterance 
as a tool to get a therapeutic investigation and/or interaction going. In the above sample, 
the opening sigh tips us off to surplus meaning. It seems to say that the patient has been 
engaged in some internal struggle. Thus, apart from explicit meanings, verbal quirks in 
tone and grammatical form, departures from normal discourse rules, truncated utterances, 
etc. can be clues to important matters and prompts to therapeutic inquiry. Such 
commenting and questioning was what I tried at first in the above exchange. However, I 
quickly deviated from a close following of the patient's "text." When she said, "I guess 
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it's time for me to leave”, I asked what made her guess, but I did not let her answer the 
question. Instead, I moved in with a pronouncement, "It's something you decide". What 
might have been going on here was a counter-transference reaction. I believe I heard the 
patient saying that she did not feel "cured" but rather exhausted, out of meanings, and 
doubtful about whether further progress could be made in the therapy. Since this was 
damaging to my therapeutic self-esteem, I unconsciously diverted the exchange onto an 
existential point about taking responsibility for one's decisions. Valid as this may be, it 
may not have been the most important issue at that time. Thus, out of counter-
transferential anxiety, I allowed one of my theoretical attitudes to intrude on the flow of 
meanings.  
 
But, what one might ask was this counter-transference or theoretical position about? 
What was at stake here? The patient's reluctance to assume full responsibility for the 
decision to terminate is not merely an expression of anxiety or lack of autonomy on her 
part. It is also, and perhaps just as importantly, a construction of our respective roles and, 
more generally, our emotional significances to each other. 
 
She is playing by the social rule of therapist as expert. In this case, my presumed 
expertise is to know when she is finished with therapy, i.e., "cured" or "cured enough". It 
is this kind of expertise that I want to disown. The reasons for this would require a long 
discussion best reserved for another place, but let it suffice here to say that they involve 
values that are in some broad sense political. However, there is no way for me to escape 
from all attributions of expertise nor is it at all clear from the exchange that I want to do 
so. In saying, "It's up to you”, I am also asserting an expertise, to wit, my professional 
opinion that it would be best (healthiest?) for her to feel she can take on this 
responsibility. There is no way for me to avoid propounding a rule about our respective 
roles and attendant jobs and obligations. By calling oneself a therapist and setting up as 
one to whom another can come for help, one is necessarily claiming some kind of 
expertise, just as the other, in coming for help, is attributing expertise. Once one has 
chosen this role and meaning, many other meanings may follow, some of which may be 
unwanted by one or both parties and can become a matter of conflict or negotiation.  
 
I do not know how many colleagues share my particular discomfort with the role of 
therapist as expert judge of another's mental health. But, I would venture to guess that at 
some time or other everyone in the field has experienced some role attribution that they 
want to disclaim. An interesting situation often occurs when a meaning (such as a role 
attribution) gets generated that neither party seems to want. This is the result of social and 
linguistic rules operating partly out of the control of either participant. It may be the case 
that something like this phenomenon was operative in the situation under examination 
here. Perhaps the patient was asking for my opinion about her leaving or staying not as an 
"expert" but merely as someone who is in a position to know because he knows her well. 
However, given that she is paying for her sessions and has come to me as one who 
presumably has some special skills for helping her, any request she directs toward me 
will take on the overtone of a request for my exercising professional knowledge. 
Everything she does or I do falls within this "contract", as it were.  
 
But, to return to the analysis of the dialogue, this part of the encounter ended at the point 
where the patient said "yeah, so I can decide...that's all..." and then paused. This pause 
constituted a choice point for the therapist to speak or not, but it was a strange choice 
point. Insofar as the patient ends her statement on a note of finality, it seems as if she 
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were saying that there is nothing to add. Perhaps she is saying, "OK, You shut me up". 
But, in so far as the long pause seems to indicate that she is ceding her turn to speak, it 
seems I am being invited to say something. Or, perhaps, I am being both invited and 
disinvited to say something here. Again, you do not need a lot of psychological theory to 
see that this is the case. It just requires some sensitivity to the normal nuances of turn-
signalling in conversation.2 I opted for saying nothing, in effect invoking a 
psychotherapeutic rule at this point, to wit, the therapist is allowed to remain silent even 
if "normal" socio-linguistic rules call for a response. I did this because the only thing I 
could think of to say looked to me like it could be received as having a presuppositional 
and prosecutory edge to it, i.e., something to the effect of asking her why she wanted to 
disown responsibility for her decision.3 This, I feared, might have destroyed any 
possibility for mutuality and collaborative investigation at this point. (By the way, I think 
that it is useful for us to think about the specific reasons for silence at any particular 
juncture rather than follow the blanket analytic rule.) As it happens, the patient had plenty 
to say on the subject of her difficulty in deciding whether to leave, which is what took up 
the next section of the dialogue. One might guess that she felt enough freedom or urgency 
about her own agenda, however conscious or unconscious, to proceed in spite of my 
previous intrusion. (It may be that my silence indicated to her some willingness on my 
part to let her concerns resume a center-stage position.) I use the word "agenda" 
advisedly here because I think it is a propos given the indirection of her remarks. She 
starts off with a topic statement about how hard It is to say goodbye, and then launches 
into a story about an analogous situation about saying "good-bye" to someone else, Ed, 
from the group (for which I was also the therapist). One theme seems clear from this 
story, although she never makes it completely explicit. That is, she has some kind of fond 
attachment to Ed and, by implication, to me that makes it difficult to separate. However, 
she does not draw out the analogy or the theme of attachment specifically. Instead, she 
leaves a space for this. I feel called upon to fill it, and I do with my series of questions 
about whether she finds it hard to say good-bye to me. Why do I do this here, i.e., say for 
her what she seems to find hard to say? There are a number of reasons, none of which 
were pre-calculated strategically on my part. Basically, her message that she has some 
fond attachment to me makes me feel good, and on some level, not completely 
consciously, I want to let her know that I know that. My acknowledging the feeling says 
that I like it and that I reciprocate it. 
  
Her following statement "It trivializes…" takes up an aspect of this theme and has many 
possible meanings of which I selected one with my comment to the effect that perhaps 
she thinks our ending our sessions together is trivial to me. That statement advances a 
psychological hypothesis that is not arrived at strictly by attending to language. There is a 
linguistic cue, of course, in her previous statement. There is an ambiguity of reference in 
the phrase, "It trivializes". The "it" seems to refer to the disembodied act of saying good-
                                                
2 The  question  of  the  rules  of  turn‐taking  in  conversation  has  received  some attention  from  socio‐  and  psycholinguists.  This  work  is  summarized  in  Pea  and Russell (1987). 
3  Bruner  (1986)  has  a  particularly  clear  discussion  of  presupposition  and presuppositional "triggers" in discourse. Here, the "why" in, for example, "Why don't 
you  want  to  take  responsibility...?"  would  be  functioning  as  a  presuppositional trigger,  i.e.,it would be presuming  the  truth of  the proposition, "You don't want  to 
take responsibility..." 
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bye, but it could also include reference to the speaker and/or to the listener.4 One might 
say that the "theory" or interpretation was a latent possibility available to the therapist and 
was triggered by the patient's saying "It trivializes…". Her form of words gave me an 
opportunity to move in with this particular meaning, and I did so by pinning down the 
referent of the "it" in her statement to me, i.e., "you think (fear) it's trivial to me". I made 
the choice to advance my hypothesis out of considerations again not completely explicit 
to myself at the time. Most therapeutic exchanges, like most social Interactions, take 
place at high speed. We do not have time to scan our assumptions and strategies. Just as 
an improvising musician does not have time to consult his built-in "knowledge", i.e., the 
principles of technique or harmony, so, most often, we do not act from spelled-out 
strategic considerations. Rather, armed with our technique and our array of implicit 
theories, we take what the situation seems to give us, just as the jazz soloist improvises at 
the moment based on what he hears in the voicings laid down by the accompanist. One 
dynamic formulation of what is happening here is that the patient is expressing a fear that 
the therapist will get the message that the patient is unaffected by the termination of 
therapy. Perhaps, he will be hurt and/or not understand his own importance to the patient. 
 
However, perhaps she is also expressing a fear that the leave-taking is trivial to the 
therapist. Maybe, she is expressing a dim awareness of the possibility that the therapist 
will defensively trivialize the relationship in his own mind if he hears her minimizing its 
importance to her. Further, maybe anticipating that the relationship is less important to 
the listener (Ed or me) than it is to her, she defensively trivializes it in her own mind and 
then fears the interlocutor may hear her trivializing it and may become hurt, etc. and so 
forth. So, in making one aspect of all this explicit, namely her fear that the relationship is 
trivial to me, I am perhaps dealing in many other resonances, but primarily I am 
reassuring her that it is not trivial to me. Was I aware of all of this at the time? Yes and 
no. It was a spontaneous decision on my part, not calculated but not uncalculated. But, 
could it be said I was choosing a meaning? Clearly, I was. Was I also choosing all the 
corollary meanings even though I was not explicitly aware of them? I am inclined to say 
that I was. But how could this be? How can one choose what one does not know? As 
therapists, I would submit that we do just this; that, paradoxically, we are responsible for 
what we do not know and, therefore, we choose what in commonsense terms we cannot 
choose, because it is our job to know that meanings are complexly numerous if not 
endless. I might add here that her drawn out “yeahh“ followed by a smile and the 
comment “isn’t that absurd?” and the more familiar “so, I guess it’s time to leave, huh?” 
all could be taken as saying “OK, I got what I wanted (needed). I mean something to you, 
I know it and own it and that means I’m cured”. Note that the patient here is implicitly 
playing by the rules of psychoanalytic attachment theory, even more so than the therapist 
who keeps avoiding special rules, reasons, and psychoanalytic theories of mental health 
by insisting “It’s up to you”. 
 
We might ask if there are any other rules or assumptions, outside of specifically 
psychodynamic formulations, that either or both players are following in this exchange 
that would enable one to generate any of the various nuances of meaning just mentioned. 
I believe one such is instantiated here, and it may well be a common "rule" of social 
interaction in an egalitarian culture such as ours. It runs somewhat as follows: A believes 
that B's evaluation of A's significance to B will have some strong relation to A's 
                                                4 For a good discussion of problems of reference see Georgia Green's (1989) book “Pragmatics and Natural Language Understanding”. 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evaluation of B's significance to A. This is the sort of cultural given that I referred to 
previously as seemingly too trivial to bear mention, but does exert an important pull on 
our social activity. If we become aware of such a rule, we will thereby gain another small 
measure of awareness and consequent range of function as therapists. This rule is 
operative in the above segment, the patient acknowledges my interpretation as accurate "I 
know that's absurd", and in her smile indicates she has received my implicit 
communication that the relationship is not trivial to me. Her next statement is interesting 
in the light of this last exchange. I can discern at least two messages in it. In saying, "So, I 
guess..." she is making an implicit connection between the leave taking issue and the 
question of our significance to each other (most saliently at this point, perhaps, her 
significance to me). The connective "so" is the tip- off here. But what is the nature of the 
connection between the question of termination and our significance to each other? 
 
One subtextual reading is that the patient realizes that with our mutual admission that we 
value each other, a key dynamic issue of hers is thereby resolved. She can accept that she 
is a somebody. But, this is to attribute a psychodynamic meaning to her that she may or 
may not have. Another way to read it is to hear her as saying that now that this issue of 
our mutual significance is cleared up, she wants to know from me if she is truly "done". 
 
The first reading puts us on equal footing more or less. At least, it does not call attention 
to any role asymmetry. The second reading operates within a framework of client and 
expert. She is asking for my professional judgment as to whether she is ready to leave. 
My response, "It's up to you. It's for you to decide" was clearly to this second subtext. 
One might say that my response was counter-transferential in what it did and did not 
respond to. Uncomfortable for both ideological and characterological reasons with the 
role of the expert judge of another's mental health, I made a somewhat moralistic 
disclaimer. Perhaps "bad faith" would be a better term than moralistic because it 
contained an instruction to her not to see me as an "expert", but paradoxically, this 
instruction was delivered from an expert's point of view. That is, I was in effect saying 
that it was my professional judgment that it would be best for her not to look to me as the 
expert judge of her degree of mental health. But, perhaps, apart from the specific content 
around the question of expertise, I was also counter-transferentially unwilling to 
acknowledge my importance to the patient and hers to me as central to the therapy. Here, 
in choosing one meaning, I was not aware of the meaning(s) I was not choosing to 
respond to. But, despite this lack of awareness, I would maintain that I was making a 
choice.5 
 
With her next statement "But, it's also...there are so many things to work on still…" it 
seems that she is trying to convince me or herself or both of the supposed necessity of 
continuing, which she has already pre-judged. In particular, her statement that she has a 
long way to go seems to invite comment, seems to be invoking a "soft" conversational 
turn-taking rule, one perhaps especially germane to the therapy situation. That is, if A 
(the patient) says something and is convinced that B (the therapist) has an opinion about 
it, A's long pause means that B is now obliged or challenged to confirm or disconfirm A's 
statement. But, at this point, I play naive by refusing to confirm or disconfirm her 
statement "I have a long way to go". Instead, I ask her about her internal state or what 
she's thinking, i.e., "What's up?". This is a violation of the above-said soft rule of normal 
                                                5 However problematic, philosophically, the concept of unconscious choice may be, it is central to any psychodynamic view of human functioning (see Fingarette, 1963). 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conversation. The reasons for doing this are a matter of therapeutic principle or ideology. 
I do not want to take responsibility for her decision to stay or leave by positing some 
absolute standard of mental health (How far she has to go). In several sessions 
immediately preceding this, she had raised the question of termination, and each time I 
had remarked that it seemed to me that she had done a lot of work, but she could stay or 
leave as she wished. On several occasions when she had brought up outstanding 
problems, I confirmed for her that these were things she was still working on, and that we 
all have things that we are still working on. 
 
On the evidence of the present session, it is hard to determine just what she heard in all 
this. Insofar as I agreed with her that there were things she was still working on, she 
might have heard me as suggesting that she ought to stay. Insofar as I am saying that we 
all are still working on things (presumably including me, that expert and paragon of 
mental health), she might have heard me giving her diploma. All of these meanings are 
close to the surface, as it were, of our exchanges. They can be easily inferred from the 
form of words that we have been using. A more theoretically derived dynamic 
understanding of her motivation is that as she becomes able to see more about herself and 
becomes more active in the work, she gets afraid of her own progress and the eventual 
separation from me that this seems to imply. She then has two responses to this conflict. 
One is to seal over and say everything is hunky-dory or as hunky-dory as it is going to 
get. The other response is to re-pathologize herself and re-submerge herself in the 
relationship with me. When I pulled the analytic move by my silent refusal to respond to 
her statement/question/challenge about her having a long way to go, I believe she got a 
little angry and compressed these two responses of hers. She said in reply to my question 
about what she was thinking that she was "tired of going over the same stuff".  
 
This seemingly simple statement was actually quite complex. The "same stuff" that she is 
referring to is indefinite in its reference. It could mean the topics of the last few sessions, 
or everything we have been talking about from the beginning. In calling it "the same", the 
patient seems to be denying that the way she has been talking about it with me is 
deepening her understanding or helping her to change. Thus, "the same" has the force of 
an accusation or criticism of me. "You're not doing your job" she seems to be saying 
"You're not helping me go deeper." It also seems to be a self-attack, a claim that she is 
still as screwed-up as ever and not getting anywhere. This take on what she is saying here 
derives not so much from dynamic metapsychology (although theory makes its 
contribution) as it does from a speech pragmatic reading of likely emotional responses to 
my refusal of her elicitation, that is the invitation to comment on her previous statement 
of how far she has to go. Among the many things at issue here is what Labov and Fanshel 
(1977), in their book on therapeutic discourse, call role strain and challenges to role 
competence. My silence is an instruction, to wit: You're supposed to figure this out for 
yourself. Her challenge is: Oh, yeah? You're not helping me like you're supposed to. 
 
But none of this exchange is stark or openly angry. It is mitigated by tone. She has a tone 
of self-investigation, self-report, simple statement of fact. My "Whyzat" response is 
slightly humorous, seemingly friendly and curious. We are both playing down the 
conflict, preserving our own and each other's "face." However, when she said it feels like 
she has not made much progress (seemingly taking responsibility for this herself but 
leaving the possible meaning that I have been negligent or incompetent), I became 
uncomfortable. I did not want it to be agreed upon between us that the therapy was 
running down and ending in a failure or only a very limited success. For one thing, I did 
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not think this was so; for another, my therapeutic self-esteem was offended; and I also 
had the feeling that she was fishing for me to say the opposite. And I did that with my 
"Weeeelll…I don't know..." statement, which, by the way, has a little trick at the end when 
I say "I don't know if you can really say that". This is a pseudo-dispassionate disavowal 
of my self-interest in her not thinking this (which, interestingly, I don't really think she 
thinks). By saying "I don't know if you can say that" instead of saying "I don't know if I 
would say that" I am construing her statement as not being all that I hear it to be, in 
particular an attempt to get me personally involved in the question of whether or not she 
has made progress. 
 
Finally, one last feature of the text calls for some comment. At the end when she says 
"OK" and "See you next week", I was experiencing some tension. I was acutely aware, 
whether erroneously or not, that what I said in response to these remarks could be taken 
as tacit approval of her desire to stay and/or my wanting her to decide to stay in therapy. 
Thus, I took great care to restrict the scope of my remarks to next week only ("See you 
then"), and was especially careful to make my "OK", echoing her "OK", completely 
neutral in tone, almost satirically so, such that it could not be taken to mean "OK, I'm 
glad you're staying" or "OK, I agree with your decision to stay". It is, of course, not clear 
that her "OK" was saying this. (In fact, we ended the therapy by mutual agreement two 
months later at the time of my and her summer vacation,) Rather, her "OK" may have 
been a response to my speech about no shoulds, something to the effect of "OK, I'll stop 
trying to palm this decision off on you" or perhaps "OK, alright already, stop preaching" 
or maybe "OK, no hard feelings". Here the "OK" has an ambiguous reference. However, 
it seemed to me from the whole tenor of (the emotional/pragmatic/semantic drift of) the 
session, that she could just as easily be saying "Ok, you've convinced me to stay", which 
is an action and motive that I wanted to disavow. Certainly, her statement about her 
chronic self-doubt, and need for and despair of her mother's approval seemed to be saying 
that although she had made progress, there was still significant work to be done. 
However, I was leery of prejudicing the case about how she could best make further 
progress. To that end, I strove mightily, one might say, a little forcedly or clumsily, in my 
speech about graduation, and in my terse, one might say, tense, final utterances, to 
present a neutral attitude about her staying or terminating, which, by the way, to the best 
of my self-knowledge, I actually felt. So, why all the striving to demonstrate neutrality? 
 
I think, as I started to indicate above, the striving or protesting too much was an attempt 
to counteract lines of semantic force which seemed to be set up by our whole exchange to 
that point, to wit, that we agree that she should stay. Here is the power of language and 
the discourse taking a hold of both participants and potentially building a false consensus, 
a case of intertextuality run amok, outside of the participants' control or intention. The 
remark about missing her was also an attempt to correct something that seemed like it 
might be suggested by the whole preceding exchange. Namely, that I am the doctor 
without memory or desire dispassionately revealing to her a pre-existing truth that she is 
not in control of. This is a position which I find personally dishonest and dangerous.  
 
Having presented a fairly detailed analysis, although not nearly as detailed as it could 
have been, of aspects of linguistic style in the therapy situation and their relation to the 
formulation of dynamic hypotheses, I want to summarize some of the linguistic/dialogic 
principles at play. First, linguistic dialogical/discoursal cues are our early warning system 
for knowing when something of psychodynamic and relational significance is going on. 
For example, conversational openings as revealed through the rules of sequencing and 
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turn-taking bear a functional relationship of unspecified complexity to therapeutic 
openings, i.e.,opportunities for intervention of various kinds. Simply to codify a set of 
criteria as to what constitutes an opening would be a whole research project, let alone the 
attempt to characterize the relationship of conversational to therapeutic openings. 
 
Second, if we want to hear all the possibilities of what our patients and we ourselves are 
saying and doing we must pay attention to the force(s) of utterances, that is, what kind of 
speech act a given utterance is, be it a statement, question, command, plea, entreaty, 
warning, promise, etc., plus the huge category of ambiguous or, as the linguists say, 
moodless utterances. There is a problem of over-simplification in this because it may be 
the case that the utterance is not the proper unit of analysis for the purpose of 
understanding therapeutic dialogue. This is because one utterance may have many forces, 
or different segments of an utterance may have different forces. And besides the question 
of illocutionary force, i.e., what kind of speech act is involved, there is the question of 
perlocutionary force, that is, the  (consciously or unconsciously) intended and/or probable 
effect of the act on the listener which may not follow the divisions of utterance, but may 
rather be divided up along segments of utterances, distributed across utterances or be 
complexly embedded or nested in utterances. We are often, I would say, necessarily, 
doing many things at once and/or cumulatively over time. The above sample emerges out 
of the background of a long therapy that dealt with this patient’s attachment to a 
disapproving parent, her consequent tendency to get involved in relationships (principally 
with male lovers) in which she was the subordinate party and another consequent 
tendency of persistent self-doubt about her life choices and competence. From my side, in 
the segment in which she doubts her progress in therapy, I can see retrospectively that I 
was responding counter-transferentially to being set up as the disapproving, judging 
parent (lover?). This response goes beyond the immediate dialogic, linguistic aspects of 
the exchange. In the whole emotional context of the relationship the words function not 
merely as bearers of quasi-propositional meaning but as emotional gestures, as actions. 
 
It is important to remind ourselves that we can never have complete control of the 
consequences or construals of our actions, linguistic and para-linguistic. Because of the 
many meanings available to participants in an exchange, and the many different social 
and linguistic rules that come into play, there is a resultant opacity to intention, a kind of 
dialogic "practico-inerte" to use Sartre's (1963) phrase. Whether or not this is more 
prevalent in the therapeutic encounter than in other situations, it behooves us as therapists 
to have a healthy respect for the extra-intentional (which, incidentally, I do not mean as 
coterminous with the "unconscious"). 
 
If we become aware of the contingency of meaning in the practico-inerte of interaction, 
that is to say, if we are cognizant of meaning's resistance to our control, then the activity 
of the therapist becomes the continuous attempt to enter the stream of meanings and the 
continuous effort to nudge the flow in one direction or another without necessarily having 
a grand plan or master interpretation. Respect for the "thingness" of meaning can help us 
see through the naiveté of the view of therapy as the linear application of higher order 
metapsychological theory (and technical postulates derived therefrom) to clinical 
"material." To see the limits to what we can control and definitively understand is to re-
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